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1. Introduction 
 For markets to function well they need to react properly to new entrants. 
Newcomers have to be able to capture a part of the market and more efficient entrants 
have to succeed in displacing, partially or completely, older less efficient firms. This 
process of readjustment and renewal is at the core of the creative destruction that is 
crucial to the progress of modern societies. Following Schumpeter, economists have 
devoted considerable attention to analyzing this process as in the work of Jovanovic 
(1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Roberts and Tybout (1997) and 
Caves (1998). 
In this paper, we present results from experiments designed to shed light on 
some particular aspects of the process of entry and exit. More specifically, we study 
how markets in which incumbent firms face entry by other firms adjust to the new 
competition. We are interested in seeing whether there is a pure incumbency or first-
mover effect, in the sense that the very fact that some firms have been present in a 
market earlier than others gives them an advantage over the latecomers. In the cases we 
will be studying, incumbents will not have the possibility of preventing entry by pre-
commiting to appropriate output levels, as in the literature that starts with Bain (1956) 
and Sylos-Labini (1962). There will be no entry cost. What we ask is whether 
incumbency itself creates an asymmetry that favors established firms and allows them 
to hold on to their position in the market.  
Our central interest is in the study of efficiency in our markets. We ask both 
whether the market prices that emerge are satisfactory from the consumers’ standpoint 
and whether more efficient entrants are able to displace the less efficient established 
firms, so that the market gives the appropriate signals to other potential entrants. In the 
environments we study there is an avoidable fixed cost so that, depending on the overall 
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cost distributions, the market may not be able to accommodate all the firms that would 
like to be present in it. In our experiments we are able to study this accomodation 
process in detail. Specifically, we study how the length of time in which incumbents are 
protected from competition, the cost advantages of entrants and the time-structure of the 
entry-process affect firm behavior and market efficiency. The impact of these three 
factors yields a broad picture of the entry process. 
Issues related to the ones we study here have been analyzed before. The strategy 
and marketing literature has paid considerable attention to the analysis of first-mover 
advantages. The seminal article is Lieberman and Montgomery (1988). More recently 
the articles by Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson (1992), Robinson, Kalyanaram and 
Urban (1994), Zahra, Nash and Bickford (1995), Mueller (1997) and Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1998) have surveyed and classified the contributions to this literature. 
These studies use field data to analyze the extent to which first-mover advantage exists 
in different industries and proposes that firms that enter the market early may be able to 
obtain advantages of various types like prime physical locations or favourable customer 
perception. 
The theoretical industrial organization literature has carefully studied the 
strategic aspects of incumbency advantages. The issue of entry deterrence by 
established firms has received considerable attention, as one of the leading instances of 
the importance of commitment in sequential games. References to and discussions of 
these issues appear in virtually all the teaching manuals in the area (see e.g. Tirole 1989, 
Basu 1993, Martin 1993 and Vives 1999). 
In this paper we approach things from a different perspective. We ask whether 
markets exhibit inertia of a non-strategic type. The existence of inertia is often 
considered in economic analysis, as when hysteresis is taken into account in macro-
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economics. Adjustment to new market circumstances often just takes time and during 
this transition those firms that were in the market first may enjoy a better situation than 
in the long run. This kind of inertia can then be a relevant factor intervening in the entry 
process of a new firms into a market and have considerable efficiency consequences. 
Some previous experimental studies have found evidence of a purely non-
strategic advantage of incumbents. Brandts, Cabrales and Charness (forthcoming) find 
evidence of first-mover advantage in an experimental study of how incumbents can use 
investment in capacity to deter entry, in which the strategic prediction is that of second-
mover advantage. There are also several studies on the topic of order of play in 
experimental games. Rapaport, Weg and Felsenthal (1990), Rapaport, Budescu and 
Suleiman (1993) and Rapaport (1997) find evidence that in bargaining games and 
sequential common resource dilemmas earlier movers take larger portions than do late 
movers. Weber, Camerer and Knez (2004) and Müller and Sadanand (2003) find that 
when simple two-person games that are simultaneous in terms of information are played 
sequentially, the first mover tends to do better than when both players make actual 
simultaneous choices. In the present paper we ask whether this kind of phenomenon 
also emerges in a market selection environment. 
Experiments have been used to study a large number of policy-relevant market 
and industrial organization issues. The focus of these studies is on the interaction of 
firms in a variety of environments. Isaac and Smith (1985) and Jung, Kagel and Levin 
(1994) study the workings of predatory pricing and Huck, Normann and Oechssler 
(2000) study effects on firm behavior of providing firm-specific price and profit data. A 
number of studies like those Rassenti et al. (2001, 2002 and 2003) Abbink et al. (2003) 
and Brandts et al. (forthcoming) analyze aspects of market power in electricity markets. 
Plott (1997) and Plott and Salmon (2004) discuss the use of experiments in relation to 
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the spectrum auctions in the US. Holt (1995) surveys some of the earlier literature on 
industrial organization experiments and Normann and Ricciuti (2004) present a more 
specific recent overview and discussion of the use of experiments for economic policy 
making. As in other areas the advantage of experimental studies of firm interaction are 
replicability and control. With respect to our experiments, we think that it will be clear 
below that it would have been difficult to carry out our analysis on the basis of field 
data alone, since in natural environments it would be unusual to find appropriate data 
with the desired variations in the cost structures, the nature of the entry process and the 
length of the incumbency period. 
We base our analysis on the case of quantity competition. This way of modeling 
the interaction between firms has been used in numerous empirical studies involving 
field data. For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) refer to quantity competition in 
theri empirical study of entry and competition in concentrated markets and Borenstein 
and Bushnell (1999) study market in the California electricity market after deregulation 
and represent it as a Cournot market with a competitive fringe. The frequent use of the 
Cournot model in applied work suggests that this is a sensible way of representing in a 
simplified manner the workings of certain markets. 
One important characteristic of experimental studies of market interaction is that 
equilibrium behavior is not imposed. Participants in the experiment know the market 
rules and in our case act under complete information, but there is no reason to expect 
(nor to impose) that they will from the start jump to the corresponding market 
equilibrium. Rather, they will make some reasonable initial decision and from then on 
react to the actions of others and to what they learn about the market environment they 
are in. This process may then lead to equilibrium or not. We believe that the lack of 
imposition of equilibrium behavior is an advantage of the experimental approach, since 
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it corresponds better to how firms have to find their way in the market. As will be seen 
below actual behavior will overall be infleucned by the most relevant equilibrium. 
However, the process of adjustment takes time and has some important qualitative 
features. 
Our results show that when incumbents and entrants have identical costs 
sufficient entry drives consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. In 
contrast, when entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer 
surplus to equilibrium, but total profits remain substantially below equilibrium. This 
goes together with the fact that incumbents are able to keep market shares significantly 
above what equilibrium prescribes. This is possible due to the willingness to accept 
negative profits for a good number of market rounds. Efficient entrants produce too 
little and earn too little. Market perfomance is satisfactory from the consumers’ 
standpoint – total production is high enough - but entrants’ low profits do not yield 
adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether 
entry is simultaneous or sequential, whereas the length of the incumbency phase does 
have some secondary effects. 
 
2. Experimental design 
All our experimental sessions start with two identical incumbents competing in 
quantities for a fixed number of periods.1 After these periods additional firms are given 
access to the market. We report data from a total of six treatments, which are 
summarized in table 1. 
 
                                                          
1 We could have started with a monopolist incumbent. However, the two incumbent case yields 
information concerning cooperation of settled firms. As shown by Huck et al. (2004) collusion is not 
easily sustained with three or more firms. 
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Table 1. Summary of Treatments 
Treatment label Timing of entry Cost distribution Incumbency duration 
Seq-Sym10 Sequential 
5  firms with identical 
marginal and fixed 
costs 
10 rounds 
Simul-Sym10 Simultaneous Same as 1.1 10 rounds 
Seq-Asym10 Sequential 
2 identical 
incumbents with 
higher marginal costs 
than the three 
identical entrants and 
identical fixed costs 
10 rounds 
Simul-Asym10 Simultaneous Same as 2.1a 10 rounds 
Seq-Asym20 Sequential Same as 2.1a 20 rounds 
Simul-Asym20 Simultaneous Same as 2.1a  20 rounds 
 
We study the effects of three treatment variables: the timing of entry, the 
distribution of firms’ costs and the duration of incumbency. The variation in these 
variables is meant to get at some of the potentially crucial aspects of the process of 
firms entering the market and the market selecting market shares for the different firms.  
The difference between sequential and simultaneous entry is the following. Under 
sequential entry one of the entrants is given access to the market in the first period after 
incumbency is over, a second firm 10 periods later and a third firm after another 10 
periods. Under simultaneous entry all entrants are given access to the market in the first 
period after incumbency is over. 
 The variation in the length of the incumbency period is motivated by our interest 
in inertia; a longer incumbency period can potentially lead to more inertia. Our 
distinction between symmetric and asymmetric cost structures is precisely directed at 
discovering – by comparison - in which way the presence of asymmetric firms affects 
behaviour. The distinction between sequential and simultaneous entry is meant to reflect 
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the situations in different types of markets. For example, in some newly deregulated 
markets entry takes place sequentially.2 
 
2.1. Theoretical Background and Research Questions 
 
What are the available theoretical benchmarks for the treatments? From previous 
experimental work by Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004) we know that behaviour in 
repeated quantity competition games can – even if the interaction takes place over 50 
rounds or more – be expected to conform to the equilibria of the corresponding one-shot 
game. Therefore, table 2 presents as our benchmarks the relevant complete information 
Cournot equilibria for  the specific parameter configurations we used. 
As can be seen from the table the demand function was always linear and the 
fixed cost was always the same for all firms in a treatment but with small variations 
across treatments. The reason for this is that we wanted equilibrium quantity choices to  
be integers for implementation in the experiment. In the two variations of treatment 1 
the five firms were identical. In all the variations of treatment 2 all three identical 
entrants have a marginal cost that is half the one of incumbents.3  
The fourth column of table 2 shows the equilibrium predictions corresponding to 
the Cournot equilibrium.4 For treatments Seq-Sym10 and Simul-Sym10 the equilibrium 
pattern is very straightforward: individual output is always positive and decreases with 
the number of firms in the market, while total output increases with this number. For the 
other four treatments the equilibrium patterns are more interesting. In rounds 11-20 of 
                                                          
2 The theoretical IO literature also distinguishes between simultaneous and sequential entry. See Vives 
(1999). 
3 We feel that this is a natural way to start. Other patterns of heterogeneous costs will be studied in future 
work. 
4 The production level that is shown always corresponds to that of the firms that have access to the market 
in the corresponding periods.   
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Seq-Asym10 (21-30 in treatment Seq-Asym20) the first of the entrants simply obtains a 
larger market share than each of the incumbents, but once the second entrant has access 
to the market the two incumbents leave the market, due to the existence of the avoidable  
 
Table 2. Cournot Equilibrium Benchmarks* 
Treatment Demand 
function 
Fixed and 
Variable Costs 
Equilibrium 
quantities 
Equilibrium 
total surplus 
Seq-Sym10 P=13-0.2Q 
FC = 15 
IMC = 1 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: 
IQ= 20 
Rounds 11-20: 
IQ=EQ=15 
Rounds 21-30: 
IQ=EQ=12 
Rounds 31-40: 
IQ=EQ=10 
Rounds 1-10: 
290  
Rounds 11-20: 
292.5 
Rounds 21-30: 
285.6 
Rounds 31-40: 
275 
Simul-Sym10 P=13-0.2Q 
FC = 15 
IMC = 1 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: 
IQ=20 
Rounds 11-40: 
IQ=EQ=10 
Rounds 1-10: 
290  
Rounds 11-40: 
275 
Seq-Asym10 P=11-0.1Q 
FC = 30 
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: 
IQ=30 
Rounds 11-20: 
IQ=20, EQ=30 
Rounds 21-30: 
IQ=0 EQ=33 
Rounds 31-40: 
IQ=0, EQ=25 
Rounds 1-10: 
300  
Rounds 11-20: 
325 
Rounds 21-30: 
383.1 
Rounds 31-40: 
378.75 
Simul-Asym10 P=11-0.1Q 
FC = 30 
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Rounds 1-10: 
IQ=30 
Rounds 11-40: 
EQ=25 
Rounds 1-10: 
300 
Rounds 31-40: 
378.75 
Seq-Asym20 P=11-0.1Q 
FC = 30  
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Same as 2.1a Analogous to 2.1a 
Simul-Asym20 P=11-0.1Q 
FC = 30 
IMC = 2 
EMC = 1 
Same as 2.2a Analogous to 2.2a 
* P stands for the market price, Q for total quantity, FC for fixed cost, IMC for incumbent 
marginal cost, EMC for entrant marginal cost, IQ for incumbent quantity and EQ for entrant quantity. The 
collusive quantity is 50 when MC=1 and 30 when MC=2  
 
 
fixed cost. In the two treatments with asymmetric firms and simultaneous entry the 
three entrants expel the incumbents from the market right away. This kind of 
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“dynamics” in which more efficient firms replace less efficient firms over time is what 
we are interested in exploring.5 
Our most general interest is in seeing how well these markets perform after entry 
takes place, both with respect to consumers and to producers. What are the research 
questions about firm behaviour for the first two treatments: Seq-Sym10 and Simul-
Sym10?6  Given that firms are identical equilibrium production levels are of course 
identical. However, perhaps incumbents will - after entry - somehow be able to keep a 
larger part of the market. The simple fact of being in the market first may give them an 
advantage in the eyes of the entrants. What is important here is that if incumbents 
produce more than the equilibrium prescribes, then the entrants’ best responses imply 
that they yield some market share to the incumbents. The intuitive notion that we posit 
here is related to some ideas and evidence about the existence of a perceived first-mover 
advantage. 
Another conjecture pertains to possibly different effects of sequential vs. 
simultaneous entry. From Huck et al. (2004) we know that repeated quantity 
competition with two firms leads to some collusion, while with three and four firms the 
Cournot stage-game equilibrium is a good predictor. However, this regularity was 
observed for the case where all firms are in the market from the start. For our cases, 
behaviour may be different. In particular for treatment Seq-Sim10 with sequential entry 
one can conjecture that the expected initial collusion of the incumbents will rather easily 
carry over to subsequent rounds; the fact that the number of firms increases gradually 
may make it possible to maintain some degree of collusion with more than two firms.  
                                                          
5 For the dynamics one important issue is the chosen time horizon. For  the experiments we present in this 
paper we chose 40 and 50 periods. A substantially longer horizon may change behavior. Additionally, to 
get closer to an infinite horizon environment it would be possible to implement a situation with random 
termination or even one in which termination would be certain but unknown to participants. 
6 Observe that our experiments are not intended to simply look at comparative statics. Rather, our design 
focuses on histroy dependence and change. 
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In contrast, for treatment Simul-Sym10 it seems a priori less likely that collusion 
will survive after round 11, since three firms will enter simultaneously and the market 
will then instantly have five firms, a number for which previous evidence suggests 
production levels close or even above the Cournot stage-game equilibrium. 
For the comparison between symmetric and asymmetric treatments it is less 
straightforward to formulate plausible a priori conjectures. The fact that incumbents are 
less efficient than entrants may cause them to yield more easily, the cost difference may 
make the option of giving in to the entrants more salient. However, at the same time 
incumbents may feel more motivated to resist the equilibrium forces, since they lead to 
incumbents’ complete defeat. If entrants anticipated such a resistance, then they may 
behave more conservatively and hence leave some share of the market for the 
incumbents. Before the fact both these possibilities make some sense.  
With respect to the asymmetric treatments another question is how the 
interaction between inefficient incumbents and efficient entrants will depend on whether 
entry is sequential or simultaneous. Here our intuition is, like for the case of identical 
firms, that sequential entry will be more favorable to incumbents’ resistance to change. 
For the comparison between treatments Seq-Asym10 and Seq-Asym20 on one 
side and treatments Simul-Asym10 and Simul-Asym20 on the other side simple 
intuition suggests that longer incumbency duration may lead to better collusion after 
entry occurs. Inertia may be a force in our context.7 
We can now succinctly state our four research questions: 
 
1. Will consumer surplus and total profits after entry be at equilibrium levels 
and, if there are significant deviations, how do they depend on the treatment 
variables? 
 
                                                          
7 For an experimental analysis of inertia in the context of how to turn around organizations that are 
suffering from coordination failure, see Brandts and Cooper (2006). 
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2. Can incumbents ensure themselves a larger than equilibrium market share 
after entry has occurred and how does this depend on whether incumbents 
are efficient or inefficient? 
 
3. Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 depend on whether entry is sequential 
or simultaneous? 
 
4. Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 depend on the length of the incumbency 
phase? 
 
2.2. Procedures 
 
The experiment was programmed using z-tree, see Fischbacher (1999), and the 
sessions were run in the experimental laboratory of UPF. The experimental participants 
were UPF students from a variety of faculties. The appendix contains a translation of 
the instructions for treatment 2.1a. In all our experiments subjects had the roles of the 
different firms, while the demand was simulated (see the instructions). Subjects had 
complete information about the parameter configuration of the group they were in. 
However, they had not information about equilibrium quantities. 
Subjects interacted in fixed groups of five over the 40 or 50 rounds to reflect the 
repeated game character of actual oligopoly markets. Two or three groups were 
simultaneously in the lab. Subjects were not told with whom of the other session 
participants they were in the same group.  
3. Results 
 We start by a general description of our data. Tables 3 contains period-per-
period actual and equilibrium quantities for all six treatments, aggregated over groups of 
each treatments. Table 4 shows analogous information for actual and equilibrium total 
surplus levels. We have data from 8, 9, 5, 6, 6 and 6 independent groups (markets) for 
the six treatments.  
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We start with treatment Seq-Sym10. The total quantity data shown in table 3 
indicate that average collusion is substantial with two firms, persists with three and four 
firms and only disappears with five firms. Figure 1 shows firms’ average production 
levels in dependence of when they are given access to the market. After entry 
incumbents average production levels are not obviously larger than those of the relevant 
entrants. Table 4, actual vs. equilibrium total surplus over all rounds, nicely shows the 
effect of “excess-entry” in our set-up, since total surplus is higher for three than for four 
and five firms. 
The data shown in tables 3 and 4 and in figure 2 for the Simul-Sym10 treatment 
suggest that for simultaneous entry things are somewhat different. Now entry does lead 
to production levels close to the Cournot equilibrium, and incumbents produce similar 
amounts than entrants. Consistent with this, entry leads to total surplus levels close to 
equilibrium ones. 
 Behaviour for the Seq-Asym10 treatment is shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5 and in 
the corresponding columns of tables 3 and 4. Total  production over time, again 
indicates collusion in the first ten periods. In subsequent periods, output levels reach 
and often “overshoot” the equilibrium levels, something that was rare for the case of 
identical firms. Figure 3 shows the average behavior of the different firms that enter at 
different points in time and figure 4 shows average behavior of the inefficient 
incumbents and average behaviour – irrespective of entry time - of the more efficient 
entrants, together with the Cournot equilibrium levels. Incumbents’ total quantity does 
decrease over time, but much more slowly than what the equilibrium levels prescribe. 
Consistent with this, entrants produce considerably less than in equilibrium. Figure 5 
shows average profits of the two types of firms. Here one can see that incumbents’ 
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profits become negative in the last part of the experiment and one may conjecture that, 
with a longer time-horizon, this would lead to the complete exit of incumbents.  
The comparison of total surplus with equilibrium total surplus in table 4 reveals 
that the markets of treatment Seq-Asym10 are under-performing over the complete 
time-horizon. The under-performance of the first ten periods is similar to what we saw 
for the case of identical firms. However, what happens in periods 11 to 40 is different 
from the identical firm case for two reasons. First, for periods 21 to 40 the difference 
between behavior and equilibrium is larger than in treatment Seq-Sym10. Second, we 
know from table 3 that the total quantity produced is not inefficient. The problem is, as 
indicated by the graphs in figure 4, that the output level is produced in an inefficient 
way. The market has difficulty in selecting the right firms to produce the right levels of 
quantities – at least in the time-horizon that we consider. In comparison with the 
identical firms case, behavior in this treatment is more favorable to the consumer but 
not so in terms of the use of production resources. Market signals to possible additional 
entrants are not the right ones. 
 For treatment Simul-Asym10 the data in table reveal that for the total quantity 
there are no clear differences with respect to the behavior of the previous treatment. 8 
Figures 6 to 7 show output decisions in the treatment at a more disaggregated level. 
Figure 6 shows average production levels of the two types of firms, as well as the 
corresponding equilibrium levels. Apart from the post-entry drop, we do not observe 
any clear time trend of incumbents’ output levels. Entrants’ average production levels 
do not exhibit any clear trend. In the final rounds, incumbents appear to produce a bit 
more and entrants a bit less than in equilibrium. Figure 7 shows average profits per type 
of player. The fact that incumbents’ average profits are negative in almost all post-entry 
                                                          
8 In rounds 11-20 firms appear to be colluding a bit more for the case of sequential entry than for that of 
simulteanoeus entry. 
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periods is surprising. The data in table 4 show again under-performance of the market 
over all 40 rounds. As before, equilibrium consumer surplus is attained; the root of the 
considerable inefficiency is the allocation of production to the two types of firms. 
 Are things different when incumbents are sheltered from entry for a longer time? 
Figures 8 to 10 depict behavior in treatment Seq-Asym20. Comparing in table 3 the 
evolution of quantity to that for the Seq-Asym10 treatment the apparent differences are 
not very striking. For rounds 11 to 20 involving a triopoly, quantities appear to be a bit 
lower in treatment Seq-Asym 20, but the differences are really minor. Similarly, the 
comparison of average production levels (figures 9 vs. 4), profits (figures 10 vs. 5) and 
surplus levels (table 4) do not reveal any relevant differences. To complete our first look 
at behavior in the different treatments figures 11 to 12 pertaining to treatment Simul-
Asym20 document that for the case of block entry the length of the incumbency has no 
effect on behavior. 
 Figure 13 presents the ratios of total profits over equilibrium profits for the six 
treatments and the four blocks of rounds and figure 14 presents the analogous 
information for consumer surplus. Taken together, these two graphs tell a good part of 
the story of what goes on in our data. Consumer surplus’ evolution over time is very 
similar in the different treatments. It is below equilibrium before entry and then moves 
upward. Total profits are, in all but one treatment, a little above equilibrium in the 
incumbency phase. After entry they increase in the two treatments with symmetric firms 
but decrease and even become negative in the other four treatments. 
 We now move to a more formal statistical analysis of behaviour. We first study 
the overall performance of markets as reflected in consumer surplus and total profit 
levels and later move to analyzing incumbents’ behaviour. Table 5 presents the results 
of OLS regressions that study the determinants of consumer surplus. The dependent 
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variables are Csi, i=1, 2, 3, 4. The label Cs pertains to the ratio between actual and 
equilibrium surplus and the number at the end refers to one of the 10 round blocks, 
except for the last two treatments where the block 1 actually had 20 rounds. In the first 
four regressions the exogenous variables are – apart from the constant – dummy 
variables corresponding to the different (exogenous) treatments. “Short” refers to and 
initial incumbency phase of ten rounds and “simul” and “seq” have the same meaning as 
in the treatment labels. The notion here is simply to see by comparison between the four 
regressions how the exogenous treatments affect behaviour over time. In the last 
regressions where the endogenous variables are Cs2, Cs3 and Cs4 we include Cs1 as 
exogenous variable to check for any level effect of pre-entry behaviour. In these and all 
our other regressions below we take each session as a separate data point. In this way 
our regression analysis is based on statistically independent information. 
Table 5. Determinants of consumer surplus 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cs1 Cs2 Cs3 Cs4 Cs2 Cs3 Cs4 
Short 
.1183341 
(.10004235) 
-.2516742 
(.076677)***  
-.1127737 
(.0573833)* 
-.1075392 
(.0669299) 
-.2908829 
(.0713993)***
-.1190991 
(.0590489) 
-0927872 
(.067955) 
Simul 
.0033156 
(.0761754) 
.0844986 
(.0581626) 
.0290225 
(.0435276) 
-.0811379 
(.0507691) 
.0834001 
(.0531455) 
.0288453 
(.0439526) 
-.0807246 
(.0505818) 
Sym 
.1053527 
(.0930456) 
.0117085 
(.0710437) 
-.2119034 
(.0531675)***
-.0821626 
(.0620127) 
-.0231989 
(.0660594) 
-.2175349 
(.0546328)*** 
-.069029 
(.0628728) 
Cs1 - - - - 
.3313386 
(.1162758)***
.0534537 
(.0961629) 
-.1246639 
(.1106667) 
Constant 
.5046755 
(.0791716)*** 
1.069584 
(.0604504)*** 
1.234489 
(.0452397)***
1.157069 
(.052766)***
.9023656 
(.0805876)***
1.207512 
(.0666479)*** 
1.219984 
(.0767001)*** 
Adjusted 
R2 
.074 .26 .50 .20 .38 .49 .20 
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 The table shows the value of the coefficient and the standard error in 
parentheses; negative coefficients indicate a worsening of the attained consumer surplus 
with respect to the equilibrium level. The first regression reveals that the collusion that 
is present in the first ten rounds is – as expected – independent of treatment; the 
strongly significant constant shows that consumer surplus is way below its equilibrium 
level; recall that there are no production inefficiency problems in the first rounds.  
The next three regressions reflect the impact of the treatment variables over 
time. The shorter incumbency phase has a negative impact which weakens over time 
both in its magnitude and its significance level. Perhaps surprisingly the simultaneity or 
sequentiality of entry has never a significant effect. Symmetry has a significantly 
negative effect in rounds 11-20 after the first entry, but no significant effect before and 
after that. 
Table 6. Determinants of total profits 
Dependent 
Variable 
Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 
Short 
.0031667 
(.0558155) 
1.097668 
(.1851885)*** 
.1617356 
(.2810005 
.1449726 
(.4083729) 
1.10275 
(.164386)*** 
.1646071 
(.2803385) 
.1404271 
(.4061353) 
Simu 
-.0356655 
(.0423383) 
-.153357 
(.1404731) 
-.0461841 
(.2131504) 
.2838034 
(..3097676) 
-.0961149 
(.1259109) 
-.0138444 
(.2147243) 
.2326096 
(.3110779) 
Sym 
-.0841235 
(.0517148) 
-.2765298 
(.171583) 
.801211 
(.2603559)***
.9853862 
(.3783705)**
-.141514 
(.1578002) 
.8774899 
(.2691072)*** 
.8646363 
(.3898641)** 
Ps1 - - - - 
1.604971 
(.4908396)***
.9067497 
(.8370617) 
-1.435387 
(1.212678) 
Constant 
1.092166 
(.0440036)*** 
.1603451 
(.1459983) 
.1540921 
(.2215343) 
-.08929017 
(.3219518) 
-1.59255 
(.5515199)***
-.8362292 
(.9405439) 
1.48478 
(1.362596) 
Adjusted 
R2 
.04 .49 .27 .20 .60 .27 .20 
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 Table 6 shows regression results corresponding to total profits (producer 
surplus). The variables Psi i=1 2, 3, 4 denote producer surplus as a ratio of equilibrium 
producer surplus for the four ten round blocks after entry. In the first regression one can 
see that initial profits are somewhat above equilibrium and that they are not affected by 
any of the treatment variables. The next three regressions reflect the evolution of profits 
over time. A shorter incumbency phase actually helps keeping profits up (in a way, an 
anti-inertia result). The symmetry dummy has a significantly positive effect on Ps3 and 
Ps4. Inspecting again figures x and y above helps interpret this finding. In the 
asymmetric cases incumbent firms frequently resist leaving the market even if this 
implies negative profits. 
 The last three regressions in table 6 reveal that the effects of the treatment 
variables are essentially not affected by the inclusion of Ps1 as exogenous variable, 
which does have a positive effect in the first ten rounds after entry.  
We now move to studying more formally incumbents’ output decisions. In table 
7 we can see the impact of the treatment variables on the variables denoted by 
Msdi=((incumbents’ profits/total profits) – (incumbents’ equilibrium profits/total 
equilibrium profits)), i=1, 2, 3, where Msd is an acronym for market share difference. 
The subscript refers here to blocks of rounds after the incumbency phase, since during 
this phase Msd is by definition zero. In equilibrium this variable is always equal to one, 
positive values correspond to incumbents being able to hold on to market share after 
entry. The first three regressions’ exogenous variables are again the treatment variables, 
in the last three regressions we condition on Ps1, a measure of collusion in the 
incumbency phase. 
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Table 7. Incumbents’ market share deviations from equilibrium
Dependent 
variable 
Msd1 Msd2 Msd3 Msd1 Msd2 Msd3 
Short -.2780945 
(.0590547)***
.1289026 
(.0598136)** 
-.0116774 
(.0654898) 
-.2789681 
(.0578234)***
.1279074 
(.0579978)** 
-.0125552 
(.0645416) 
Simul .0234117 
(.0447954) 
.0029767 
(.0453711) 
.0409028 
(.0496767) 
.0135728 
(.0442896) 
-.0082312 
(.0444232) 
-0310167 
(.0494354) 
Sym -.0873784 
(.0547161) 
-.4781715 
(.0554192)***
-.2667021 
(.0606784)***
-.1105851 
(.0555068)* 
-.5046073 
(.0556742)*** 
-.2900203 
(.0619558)*** 
Ps1 - - - -.258647 
(.172645) 
-.3142496 
(.1731754)* 
-.2771904 
(.1927144) 
 
Constant .3529608 
(.0465574)***
..3299283 
(.047155/)*** 
.2815486 
(.0516306)***
.6542508 
(.193999)*** 
.6731411 
(.1945843)*** 
.5842865 
(.2165388)** 
Adjusted 
R2 .54 .68 .41 .56 .70 .43 
  
Here we can see that symmetry has a significantly negative impact on the Msd 
variable. Consistent with what we have seen above, in the asymmetric treatments the 
incumbents are able to maintain larger than equilibrium market shares to a statistically 
significant degree. The length of the incumbency phase also has a statistically 
significant impact, negative in the first ten post-entry rounds and positive in the second 
ten post-entry rounds. 
We can now formulate four regularities which are answers to the four research 
questions that we posed in section 2.1. In the concluding section we discuss their 
implications. 
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Regularity 1: When firms are identical consumer and total surplus reach 
equilibrium levels after enough entry. When incumbents are less efficient than entrants 
consumer surplus tend to equilibrium but total surplus remains considerably below 
equilibrium. These results are independent of whether entry is sequential or 
simultaneous and of the length of the incumbency phase. 
 
 Regularity 2: When firms are identical incumbents are not able to hold on to a 
larger than equilibrium market share. When incumbents are less efficient than entrants, 
incumbents’ post-entry actual market shares are significantly larger than in 
equilibrium. 
 
 Regularity 3: Whether entry is simultaneous or sequential has no effect on 
consumer surplus, total surplus and incumbent market shares? 
 
 Regularity 4: A shorter incumbency phase leads to lower consumer surplus and 
higher profits in rounds 21-30 after first entry. It has a significantly negative impact on 
incumbents’ market in rounds 11-20 and to a significantly positive impact in rounds 21-
30. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
We can now get back to the major themes that we presented in the introduction 
to the paper. The experiments we present in this paper are meant to be a contribution to 
the understanding of the market selection process. We find that in the different 
treatments with asymmetric firms incumbents produce significantly more and entrants 
significantly less of what the relevant equilibrium prescribes. Consistent with this, profit 
levels in these markets is substantially below equilibrium. For the incumbents this can 
be seen as a purely tactical action to try to limit the entrants’ market share, since they do 
not have any strategic advantage in terms of an entry cost or any other factor. 
The replacement of inefficient firms by more efficient ones is, in our 
environment, not a clean process; it takes place with some turbulence. This is perhaps 
the main idea to take away from our work: market selection of more efficient firms 
works eventually, but during a certain transition phase some of the agents in the market 
will oppose resistance to market forces and by doing it distort market signals. 
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 It is interesting that in the symmetric markets of our treatments with symmetric 
firms we do not observe significant incumbency advantages. This suggests that 
observed behavior in the asymmetric markets is not just the result of incumbents having 
“deep pockets” due to the accumulated earnings from the duopoly phase. There is 
something in the characteristics of the asymmetric equilibrium that is difficult for 
participants to gauge or accept. One possibility is that in the experiment incumbents 
resisted obtaining lower payments in the experimental currency. However, we used 
different conversion rates for participants with different entry points. Also, when entry 
occurs incumbents have had an incumbency phase behind them in which they have been 
able to accumulate earnings, so that from the point of view of relative payoffs 
incumbents should not necessarily feel as being behind. We feel that instead 
incumbents’ behavior is driven by some sense of entitlement and the fact that 
accumulated earnings make their costly resistance more bearable. 
 The incumbency advantage that we observe does not hurt consumers. The fights 
for the market between incumbents and entrants lead to large output levels and low 
prices. However, production inefficiencies are considerable and lead to total surplus 
levels of about 80% of the equilibrium levels. 
 The fact that incumbents often earn negative profits when they behave in such a 
way indicates that it will not be sustainable in the long-run. We conjecture that after 
enough time behavior will resemble rather closely the one corresponding to the Cournot 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, the behavior we observe does not appear to be a simple 
anomaly of the very short run. 
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Table 3. Total Quantity  (actual vs. equilibrium) 
 TREATMENT 
Seq-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym20 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym20 
Period Q(equ.) Q(actual
) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
Q (Equ.) Q 
(Actual) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
Q (equ.) Q 
(actual) 
1 40 31,13 40 22,79 60 41,8 60 27,83 60 37 60 35,17
2 40 34 40 24,55 60 47,4 60 28,17 60 42 60 31,67
3 40 31,63 40 26,55 60 46 60 37,5 60 47,33 60 32
4 40 31,75 40 29,33 60 42,6 60 40,67 60 44,67 60 36,67
5 40 31,13 40 33 60 46,6 60 40 60 44,17 60 35,17
6 40 32,63 40 35,33 60 45 60 41,83 60 43,83 60 37
7 40 33,38 40 35,44 60 41,8 60 47,5 60 45,5 60 40,17
8 40 33,75 40 38,22 60 46 60 49 60 46,83 60 39,67
9 40 36,25 40 37,67 60 49,6 60 47,67 60 44,33 60 34,67
10 40 37,5 40 36,33 60 43,8 60 43,33 60 45,33 60 38,17
11 45 49,75 50 59,99 70 63,6 75 78 60 47 60 41,17
12 45 36,38 50 44,77 70 54,6 75 74,83 60 50,33 60 45,5
13 45 33,88 50 40,65 70 61,4 75 65 60 48,67 60 47,3
14 45 38,5 50 43,45 70 65,2 75 72,5 60 48,33 60 48,33
15 45 40,15 50 48,88 70 57,8 75 61,33 60 48,33 60 48,67
16 45 36,25 50 43,45 70 66,6 75 74,67 60 47 60 48,83
17 45 38 50 47,99 70 70,4 75 73,5 60 49,5 60 50
18 45 39,13 50 44,33 70 63 75 79,67 60 50 60 50,67
19 45 37,38 50 45,78 70 62,4 75 72,33 60 49,5 60 52,67
20 45 38,88 50 50,78 70 60,6 75 71,67 60 52,5 60 46,33
21 48 44,88 50 49,23 66 65,4 75 75 70 55,33 75 77,33
22 48 39,75 50 47 66 63,4 75 72,17 70 52,5 75 61,33
23 48 44,13 50 46,55 66 72,6 75 70,67 70 58,5 75 62,67
24 48 44 50 48,21 66 77,8 75 73 70 60,67 75 78,5
25 48 41,25 50 50,22 66 76,6 75 70,5 70 62,17 75 79
26 48 47,13 50 51 66 67 75 75,17 70 62 75 73,67
27 48 43,3 50 50,89 66 61,6 75 75,67 70 62,83 75 81,17
28 48 48,75 50 44,43 66 69,6 75 70 70 64 75 78
29 48 48,13 50 47,23 66 66,4 75 76,67 70 66,33 75 91
30 48 45,17 50 47,21 66 77,2 75 76,67 70 68,17 75 70,83
31 50 47,38 50 47,54 75 88,8 75 78,5 66 78,17 75 68,33
32 50 50 50 47,21 75 72,8 75 76,33 66 70 75 72,5
33 50 44,13 50 50,65 75 75,8 75 79 66 66,33 75 79
34 50 45,1 50 47,45 75 77,8 75 73,67 66 69,33 75 75,83
35 50 50,07 50 49,98 75 72,6 75 78,67 66 67,83 75 75,33
36 50 52,25 50 43,9 75 83 75 82,5 66 73,33 75 74,5
37 50 51,88 50 44,32 75 77,6 75 83,67 66 75,5 75 73,67
38 50 45,13 50 44,95 75 76,6 75 80 66 63,5 75 80,83
39 50 48,75 50 44,21 75 85,6 75 77,83 66 66 75 74,33
40 50 44,75 50 45,74 75 88,8 75 76 66 69,67 75 81
41         75 71,17 75 72,17
42         75 68 75 82,17
43         75 68,67 75 80
44         75 70 75 79,33
45         75 75,17 75 80,83
46         75 70,83 75 83,17
47         75 71,67 75 74,17
48         75 68,83 75 74,83
49         75 66,33 75 83,17
50         75 71,5 75 83,83
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Table 4. Total Surplus (actual vs. equilibrium) 
 TREATMENT 
Seq-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Sym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym10 
TREATMENT 
Seq-Asym20 
TREATMENT 
Simul-Asym20 
Period TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS 
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
TS  
(equ.) 
TS 
(actual) 
1 290 246,62 290 191,54 300 228,84 300 79,79 300 204,55 300 128,25
2 290 262,4 290 204,37 300 254,26 300 83,21 300 229,8 300 112,5
3 290 249,49 290 218,15 300 248,2 300 132,3 300 253,98 300 114
4 290 250,19 290 235,96 300 232,66 300 150,27 300 242,24 300 135
5 290 246,62 290 257,1 300 250,82 300 145,87 300 239,97 300 128,25
6 290 255,06 290 269,16 300 243,75 300 152,58 300 238,43 300 136,5
7 290 259,11 290 269,70 300 228,84 300 178,45 300 245,99 300 150,75
8 290 261,09 290 282,57 300 248,2 300 187,83 300 251,83 300 148,5
9 290 273,59 290 280,12 300 263,39 300 173,92 300 240,73 300 126
10 290 279,38 290 273,99 300 238,28 300 159,17 300 245,24 300 141,75
11 292,5 304,49 275 285 325 300,15 378,75 285,93 300 252,55 300 155,25
12 292,5 259,19 275 261,81 325 272,94 378,75 262,73 300 266,33 300 174,75
13 292,5 246,75 275 247,57 325 295,70 378,75 218,33 300 259,58 300 183
14 292,5 268,78 275 257,61 325 309,05 378,75 260,56 300 258,19 300 187,5
15 292,5 275,6 275 272,62 325 285,36 378,75 205,8 300 258,19 300 189
16 292,5 258,59 275 257,6 325 311,42 378,75 269,98 300 252,55 300 189,75
17 292,5 266,6 275 270,57 325 319,59 378,75 271,46 300 262,99 300 195
18 292,5 271,42 275 260,45 325 299,15 378,75 298,45 300 265 300 198
19 292,5 263,81 275 264,78 325 298,71 378,75 261,28 300 262,99 300 207
20 292,5 270,37 275 276,5 325 292,78 378,75 258,02 300 274,69 300 178,5
21 285,6 277,12 275 273,39 383,1 287,74 378,75 279,42 325 370,4 378,75 293,29
22 285,6 258,99 275 268,1 383,1 281,22 378,75 263,75 325 354,44 378,75 212,29
23 
285,6 
274,79
8 275 266,91 383,1 311,26 378,75 252,46 325 385,19 378,75 217,26
24 285,6 274,4 275 271,10 383,1 318,76 378,75 260,14 325 390,79 378,75 301,36
25 285,6 264,84 275 275,44 383,1 316,82 378,75 246,02 325 396,17 378,75 304,35
26 285,6 283,42 275 276,90 383,1 296,75 378,75 278,77 325 410,73 378,75 275,23
27 285,6 272,08 275 276,69 383,1 283,67 378,75 281,22 325 396,6 378,75 319,33
28 285,6 287,34 275 260,76 383,1 302,19 378,75 249,13 325 383,83 378,75 299,14
29 285,6 285,9 275 268,70 383,1 295,15 378,75 288,31 325 393,26 378,75 373,38
30 285,6 288 275 268,65 383,1 322,01 378,75 289,65 325 400,6 378,75 264,14
31 275 269,06 275 269,48 378,75 322,73 378,75 297,27 383,1 329,57 378,75 248,48
32 275 275 275 268,64 378,75 292,81 378,75 287,36 383,1 322,92 378,75 269,32
33 275 259,8 275 276,27 378,75 296,92 378,75 297,13 383,1 312,41 378,75 304,81
34 275 262,8 275 269,24 378,75 302,56 378,75 270,81 383,1 327,8 378,75 289,08
35 275 275,14 275 274,96 378,75 291,26 378,75 298,50 383,1 319,55 378,75 285,97
36 275 278,99 275 259,09 378,75 308,35 378,75 319,43 383,1 324,33 378,75 285,28
37 275 278,4 275 260,41 378,75 300,11 378,75 322,83 383,1 339,05 378,75 276,1
38 275 262,87 275 262,36 378,75 305,02 378,75 304,76 383,1 315,47 378,75 314,27
39 275 272,34 275 260,07 378,75 320,83 378,75 295,4 383,1 324,75 378,75 279,3
40 275 261,74 275 264,65 378,75 320,33 378,75 281,68 383,1 330,38 378,75 315,61
41         378,75 285,27 378,75 268,9
42         378,75 273,97 378,75 322,8
43         378,75 283,08 378,75 310,74
44         378,75 285,83 378,75 306,12
45         378,75 295,33 378,75 313,34
46         378,75 283,8 378,75 329,76
47         378,75 285,86 378,75 277,58
48         378,75 282,43 378,75 281,03
49         378,75 275,16 378,75 327,33
50         378,75 288,89 378,75 329,73
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Figure 1: Average q across firm groups for Treatment Seq-Sym10
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Figure 2: Average q (incumbents vs. entrants) for Treatment Simul-Sym10
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Figure 3: Average q across firm groups for Treatment Seq-Asym10
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Figure 4: Average q (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Seq-Asym10
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Figure 5: Average profit (inefficient vs. efficient) for Treatment Seq-Asym10 
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Figure 6: Average q (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Simul-Asym10 
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Figure 7: Average Profit (inefficient vs. efficient) for Treatment Simul-Asym10
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Figure 8: Average q across firm groups for Treatment Seq-Asym20
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Figure 9: Average q (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Seq-Asym20
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Figure 10: Average Profits (inefficient vs. efficient) for Treatment Seq-Asym20
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Figure 11: Average q (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Simul-Asym20
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Figure 12: Average Profit (inefficient vs. efficient) and (actual vs. equ.) for Treatment Simul-Asym20
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Figure 13: TP(actual) / TP(equ) ratio across treatments
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Figure 14: CS(actual) / CS(equ) ratio across treatments
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APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT 2.1a 
General Information.  
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how people 
make decisions in a particular situation. During the session it will not be permitted to talk or communicate 
with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your 
table to answer it. During the session you will earn money. During the session the income will be 
denominated in points. At the end of the session the points will be converted into euros in a way that is 
explained below. 
 At the end of the session the amount you have earned will be paid to you in cash. Payments are 
confidential, we will not inform any of the other participants of the amount that you earn. 
 
Groups and types in groups. 
 
 During the experiment you will be in a group of five, you and another four participants. Each 
group will be composed by the same five persons during the whole experiment. The members of each 
group will be of different types: A, B, C, D and E. Types A and B will be in one situation, type C will be 
in a different situation, type D in a different situation, and type E in again a different situation. The 
composition of the groups and the types within the groups will be determined randomly. 
 
Periods. 
 
 The session consists of 40 periods. In periods 1 to 10 the types A and B of each group will make 
decisions and the types C, D and E will not make decisions. After each of the periods 1 to 10 all the types 
in one group will receive information about the decisions made by the A and B in the group. 
 In periods 11 to 20 types A, B and C of each group will make decisions and types D and E will 
not make decisions. After each of the periods 11 to 20 all the types in one group will receive information 
about the decisions made by the A, B and C in the group. 
In periods 21 to 30 types A, B, C and D of each group will make decisions and type E will not 
make decisions. After each of the periods 21 to 30 all the types in one group will receive information 
about the decisions made by the A, B, C and D in the group. 
In periods 31 to 40 types A, B, C, D and E of each group all will make decisions. After each of 
the periods 31 to 40 all the types in one group will receive information about the decisions made by the A, 
B, C, D and E in the group. Period 40 will be the last of the session. 
 
 
Decisions and periods 
Periods Types that make decisions Types that don’t make 
decisions 
1-10 A y B C, D y E 
11-20 A, B y C D y E 
21-30 A, B, C y D E 
31-40 A, B, C, D y E - 
 
 
Decisions and earnings. 
 
 When somebody has the possibility of making a decision, this decision will consist in which 
quantity to produce to sell in a market. Any integer quantity between 0 and 30 can be chosen.  
 In periods 1 to 10, types A and B of each group will have to decide individually which quantity 
to produce. Participants C, D and E will not make decisions and their earnings in these periods will be 
zero. 
 The earnings of each period for A and B will depend on their decisions. If type A or B produces 
zero in a period his earnings in that period will be zero. If he produces a positive quantity then the 
earnings will be 
 
Earnings = (Price –MC)*quantity produced by the participant – F, 
 
MC = 2. This is called “marginal cost” and is paid for each produced unit. 
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F=30. This is called “fixed cost”. It is a fixed quantity which will be subtracted any time that the quantity 
produced by the participant is positive.  
 
 The price depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A and B. To see what prices 
correspond to the different sums of quantities see the table on the next page. Observe that the larger the 
sum of quantities produced by A and B the lower the price. If the resulting price is very low or negative 
the earnings from the period can be negative 
 
TOTAL 
QUANTITY 
PRODUCED 
PRICE  TOTAL 
QUANTITY 
PRODUCED 
PRICE  TOTAL 
QUANTITY 
PRODUCED 
PRICE 
        
1 10.9  41 6.9  81 2.9 
2 10.8  42 6.8  82 2.8 
3 10.7  43 6.7  83 2.7 
4 10.6  44 6.6  84 2.6 
5 10.5  45 6.5  85 2.5 
6 10.4  46 6.4  86 2.4 
7 10.3  47 6.3  87 2.3 
8 10.2  48 6.2  88 2.2 
9 10.1  49 6.1  89 2.1 
10 10  50 6  90 2 
11 9.9  51 5.9  91 1.9 
12 9.8  52 5.8  92 1.8 
13 9.7  53 5.7  93 1.7 
14 9.6  54 5.6  94 1.6 
15 9.5  55 5.5  95 1.5 
16 9.4  56 5.4  96 1.4 
17 9.3  57 5.3  97 1.3 
18 9.2  58 5.2  98 1.2 
19 9.1  59 5.1  99 1.1 
20 9  60 5  100 1 
21 8.9  61 4.9  101 0.9 
22 8.8  62 4.8  102 0.8 
23 8.7  63 4.7  103 0.7 
24 8.6  64 4.6  104 0.6 
25 8.5  65 4.5  105 0.5 
26 8.4  66 4.4  106 0.4 
27 8.3  67 4.3  107 0.3 
28 8.2  68 4.2  108 0.2 
29 8.1  69 4.1  109 0.1 
30 8  70 4  110 0 
31 7.9  71 3.9  111 -0.1 
32 7.8  72 3.8  112 -0.2 
33 7.7  73 3.7  113 -0.3 
34 7.6  74 3.6  114 -0.4 
35 7.5  75 3.5  115 -0.5 
36 7.4  76 3.4  116 -0.6 
37 7.3  77 3.3  117 -0.7 
38 7.2  78 3.2  118 -0.8 
39 7.1  79 3.1  119 -0.9 
40 7  80 3  120 -1 
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In periods 11 to 20, types A, B and C of each group will have to decide individually which 
quantity to produce. Participants D and E will not make decisions and their earnings in these periods will 
be zero. 
 The earnings of each period for A, B and C will depend on their decisions. If type A, B or C 
produces zero in a period his earnings in that period will be zero. If he produces a positive quantity then 
the earnings will be: 
 
Earnings = (Price –MC)*quantity produced by the participant – F, 
 
MC = 2. This is called “marginal cost” and is paid for each produced unit. 
 
with MC = 2 and F=30 as before for types A and B, and MC=1 and F=30 for type C. 
 
 The price now depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A, B and C, following the 
same table as before. If the resulting price is very low or negative the earnings from the period can be 
negative.  
In periods 21 to 30, types A, B, C and D of each group will have to decide individually which 
quantity to produce. Participant E will not make decisions and his earnings in these periods will be zero. 
The earnings of each period for A, B, C and D will be determined by the same expression as before, with 
MC=1 and F=30 for type D.  
 The price now depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A, B, C and D following 
the same table as before. If the resulting price is very low or negative the earnings from the period can be 
negative.  
In periods 31 to 40, types A, B, C, D and E of each group will have to decide individually which 
quantity to produce. The earnings of each period for A, B, C, D and E will be determined by the same 
expression as before, with MC=1 and F=30 for type E.  
 The price now depends on the sum of the quantities produced by types A, B, C, D and E 
following the same table as before. If the resulting price is very low or negative the earnings from the 
period can be negative.  
 
 
Information after each period. 
 
 After each period you will all be informed of the total quantity produced by the group, of your 
own production and (in case it applies) of your earnings in points. You will also be informed of your 
accumulated earnings. 
 
Types and identification numbers 
 
 On your screen you will see your identication number. 
The participants with identification numbers 1, 6, and 11 will be the types A of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 2, 7, and 12 will be the types B of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 3, 8, and 13 will be the types C of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 4, 9, and 14 will be the types D of each of the groups. 
The participants with identification numbers 5, 10, and 15 will be the types E of each of the groups. 
 
 
Total earnings. 
 
 At the beginning of the session each participant will receive and additional endowment of 330 
points. After each period the earnings of the period will be added to (or subtracted from) the initial 
endowment to determine the current earnings in points.  
 At the end of the session the earnings in points will be transformed into euros. The exchange rate 
will be different for each type. 
 For types A and B each point will be exchanged for 0,021 euros. 
For type C each point will be exchanged for 0,019 euros. 
For type D each point will be exchanged for 0,029 euros. 
For type E each point will be exchanged for 0,075. euros. 
  
 
